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fter four years of diplomatic stalemate, there 
appeared to be some movement around the 
‘frozen’ conflict in Western Sahara early in 
2007, with a ‘fresh’ Moroccan proposal presented to a 
UN Security Council meeting on April 11th. The 
outcome of this submission, and its Sahrawi 
counterpart,
1 was a UNSC resolution calling on: 
the parties to enter into negotiations 
without preconditions in good faith, taking 
into consideration the developments of the 
last months, with a view to achieving a just, 
lasting and mutually acceptable political 
solution, which will provide for the self-
determination of the people of the Western 
Sahara. 
The protagonists agreed to hold a meeting on 18-19 
June in New York under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General’s personal envoy
2, who invited the 
‘interested parties’, namely Algeria and Mauritania, as 
well as the ‘group of the Western Sahara friends’, 
made up of the United States, France, Spain the UK 
and Russia, to participate as observers.
3 But, apart 
from agreeing to meet again in August, Morocco and 
the Polisario Front failed to agree on much else. This 
looks like another round of manoeuvring and counter-
manoeuvring in an enduring dispute which will 
continue to beset the UN for some time to come.   
                                                 
1 Submitted one day before by the Sahrawis’ 
representative body, the Polisario Front (Frente Popular 
de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro). 
2 Peter van Walsum. 
3 The latter group of countries ended up not attending. 
Spain also wanted to attend, but the Sahrawi delegation 
objected. Algeria and Mauritania attended the opening 
and closing sessions only.  
The proposed Moroccan initiative for negotiating an 
autonomy status in the Sahara region stipulates the 
establishment of an “autonomous Sahara region…in 
the framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty and 
national unity”. Whilst hailed by the political 
establishment in Morocco as an “historic initiative”, it 
remains far from a novel idea since the notion of 
‘autonomy as compromise’ dates back to the days of 
the late King Hassan II. The idea never bore fruit, 
however, due to its total exclusion of, and 
contradiction with, the defining principles of self-
determination. The move was motivated by an 
international conjuncture, perceived by its architects to 
be favourable to the Kingdom’s thesis, which enjoys 
strong French and Spanish support, and the current US 
administration’s renewed interest in the region 
stemming from its war against terror. The Polisario 
Front’s scheme, which proposes ‘a mutually 
acceptable political solution that provides for the self-
determination of the people of Western Sahara’, does 
not reject the option of autonomy but requests that it 
be listed among several choices, including full 
independence and full integration, to be submitted by 
referendum to the people of Western Sahara.  
Months of diplomatic campaigning saw Morocco take 
its proposal to a number of political capitals around the 
world in an attempt to canvass its initiative. 
Capitalising on a predominantly security-oriented 
argument, the proposal elicited a largely positive 
response. But by ostracising the Sahrawis and the 
Algerians, the Moroccans did not advance the interests 
of trust, which is crucial in such situations. It looked, 
once more, as though the Moroccans were more 
interested in impressing outside onlookers than 
engaging in a genuine process of negotiations. The 
vagueness in which the terms of the proposal are 
couched further reinforced this view. 
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Since the extension of the US-led global war on terror 
into the Sahel region, Morocco has argued that 
autonomy in the Western Sahara is best not only for 
stability in the Kingdom but also for the Maghreb and 
the international community as a whole. Its logic is 
based on two suggestions:  
  that the Polisario Front is training terrorists in the 
region and that the ‘oppressed’ refugees in the 
camps near Tindouf in southwest Algeria are 
vulnerable to recruitment campaigns by ‘Al-Qaeda 
in the Maghreb’; and 
  the creation of a new vulnerable state would 
destabilise the region by potentially serving as a 
safe haven for terrorists, just like Afghanistan 
prior to 9/11.  
Whilst terrorist threats undeniably exist in the region, 
chiefly materialising thus far in Algeria and Morocco, 
their links to the Polisario Front remain fanciful. Even 
more uncertain is whether Morocco’s autonomy plan is 
likely to satisfy a lost generation of Sahrawis and 
dissuade them from resorting to violence. Indeed, more 
than 30 years of Moroccan political, military and 
socio-economic presence in over 80% of the Western 
Saharan territories have failed to quash routine 
uprisings in the major cities of the region.  
The UN has always regarded the question of Western 
Sahara as a matter of decolonisation and defined its 
resolution in terms of self-determination. However, its 
efforts since 1991
4 to operationalise these principles by 
                                                 
4 Date of coming into effect of UN-brokered ceasefire 
and deployment of the MINURSO (Mission des Nations 
holding a referendum have failed because the 
Realpolitik approach of the UN’s permanent five, 
particularly France and the US, has thus far taken 
precedence over international law. The 16-year 
ceasefire has avoided loss of life in the conflict, but it 
has ironically not helped resolve the standoff by 
making it a ‘Chapter 6’ – requiring resolution by 
consensus between the antagonists – rather than a 
‘Chapter 7’ case of the UN Charter – which would 
endow the Council with the power to impose 
arbitration based on its resolutions.  
What are the odds of success for the negotiations this 
time round, bearing in mind that the positions of both 
parties failed to converge during this first two-day 
meeting? Sahrawi negotiators stated ahead of the 
meeting that they were not going to make any 
concessions on the principle of self-determination. 
Having, in their opinion, made costly and yet 
unrewarded concessions in the past, such as accepting 
the 2003 Baker Plan II,
5 they have now declared that 
the failure of  direct negotiations this time would result 
in resumption of ‘armed resistance’. Algeria, for its 
part, has indicated that, should a fair and free 
referendum be held, it would support any choice made 
by the Sahrawis even if this meant full integration with 
Morocco. The Moroccans argue in fact that the 
Polisario Front is a mere appendage of Algeria’s 
policy towards the Kingdom, which aims at preventing 
the latter from ‘repossessing its southern provinces’, 
regardless of the fact that no country or international 
organisation recognises Morocco’s sovereignty over 
these territories.  
Paris and Madrid
6 are the only European protagonists 
to qualify the Moroccan proposal as ‘constructive’. 
Washington sees it as a ‘positive effort’ but its 
diplomats both in Rabat and Algiers reiterated the self-
determination principle. The European Union, apart 
from its intermittent parliamentary declarations, has, 
despite its weight as a potential broker, remained 
conspicuously disengaged from the conflict – most 
probably at the behest of France and Spain. Nobody 
needs reminding that a return to an armed conflict in 
the Western Sahara, in a context of international 
terrorism, would have serious consequences not only 
for the stability of the Maghreb but potentially for 
                                                                               
Unies pour un referendum au Sahara Occidental). See 
map above.  
5 Consisting of granting Morocco a five-year autonomy 
period at the end of which a referendum would be held in 
which Moroccan settlers would be allowed to take part. 
The plan was rejected by Morocco because it included the 
independence option.  
6 Spain, the former colonial power in the Western Sahara 
until 1975, withdrew hastily from the territories after the 
fall of Franco and avoided the UN process of self-
determination by sealing a secret deal with Morocco and 
Mauritania, which subsequently invaded the territories. 
As such, it is said to bear a moral duty towards the 
region.   
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Europe as well. The Polisario leadership for its part 
seems convinced that, in view of the unconditional 
support that Morocco enjoys from France and Spain in 
particular, in addition to America’s reluctance to upset 
the balance of power in the region, only ‘resistance by 
its own means’ will help it achieve its goal.  
The inter-state dynamics of the conflict have not 
meaningfully changed – not for the better at least. It is 
not clear therefore what the Security Council’s latest 
resolution could mean when it calls on the parties to 
take account of ‘the developments of the last months’. 
If the positions of the main protagonists are 
unchanged, little can be expected from proposals either 
for autonomy or independence. Morocco is more 
determined than ever to deny the Sahrawis the right to 
a referendum as stipulated in most UN resolutions on 
the issue, despite the fact that the outcome of an 
eventual vote is not obvious for either side. Mohamed 
VI’s entourage know that this would exacerbate an 
increasingly strained sovereign-subject relationship in 
Morocco. The Polisario, for their part, are aware that 
the time factor is not on their side, both within their 
camps and outside. As to Algeria, it is, now more than 
ever, convinced that a full recovery on the regional 
scene after more than a decade of isolation is at stake 
in the rivalry that brings it into conflict with 
neighbouring Morocco, neighbouring Morocco; the 
regional geopolitical dimension of this conflict can be 
said to be a reflection of this rivalry.  
The same goes for the European powers. Even with a 
new president in France, who is likely at a minimum to 
break away from Chirac’s quasi-paternalistic 
protection of Mohamed VI, not much change can be 
expected. Between France and Morocco, the 
connections run deeper than personal relationships at 
the state level. Furthermore, even if France wanted to 
broker a deal between Morocco and the Algeria-
backed Polisario, it would not be able to do so because 
of its historical legacy in the region. Spanish 
governments, in their turn, seem unable to keep a 
balance of interests between Morocco and Algeria. 
Whilst the former Aznar government succeeded in 
raising the country’s relationship with Algeria to a 
historic high, it almost went to war against Morocco in 
2002. Socialist Zapatero, on the other hand, has 
managed to reverse the situation. His government’s 
relationship with Algeria has deteriorated lately due to 
an extremely complicated gas dispute between their 
respective national oil and gas companies, which, 
while a primarily commercial matter, has a political 
dimension to it.  
Unless war breaks out, no international actor in the 
present configuration seems able or willing to engineer 
a lasting resolution to the conflict. Besides, it would be 
utopian to suggest this should be left solely to the 
parties involved, given their ‘quasi-irreconcilable’ 
positions.  
Could the United States bring a solution to the table, 
offer the incentives for the parties to cooperate and 
provide the guarantees for a lasting breakthrough? The 
last time the US got involved was in 2005, when it 
successfully brokered the release of more than 400 
Moroccan POWs from the Polisario’s detention 
centres. Although it has traditionally backed its long-
standing ally in the region on this issue, the US is now 
more cautious and tries to balance its relations with 
Morocco and Algeria, the latter having become a key 
partner in the global war on terror. From Africom
7 to 
WTO accession, along with other political, military 
and economic incentives, the United States’ leverage 
in this conflict is considerable. Whilst it may have 
reservations about a new state in the Maghreb, the US 
recognises the strategic importance of the Sahel region 
in its war against terror. It is therefore crucial to secure 
the cooperation of Algeria in particular, whose 
territory covers most of the region and borders all 
surrounding countries, but this would not be offered up 
for free.  
As a dispute in which international law conflicts with 
geopolitical interests, the Western Sahara will need 
more than ‘Chapter 6’ UN resolutions to be settled. 
Faced with the inability, on the one hand, of Morocco, 
the Polisario Front and Algeria to find a solution 
amongst themselves and, on the other, of the 
Europeans to engage in a constructive role, the 
Western Saharan Frente de liberación has no choice 
but to involve the United States one way or another. 
Should the US decide to become actively involved, 
however, bringing back the Baker Plan II would 
indeed be the optimum solution.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The US military is planning to set up, as of September 
2008, an Africa Command centre around the Sahel 
region. Morocco has offered to host the Africom. Algeria 
rejected it.  About CEPS
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